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Abstract We apply a key construct from the entre-
preneurship field, entrepreneurial orientation (EO), in
the context of long-lived family firms. Our qualitative
in-depth case studies show that a permanently high
level of the five EO dimensions is not a necessary
condition for long-term success, as traditional entre-
preneurship and EO literature implicitly suggest.
Rather, we claim that the level of EO is dynamically
adapted over time and that the original EO scales
(autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness,
and competitive aggressiveness) do not sufficiently
capture the full extent of entrepreneurial behaviors in
long-lived family firms. Based on these considerations
we suggest extending the existing EO scales to provide
a more fine-grained depiction of firm-level corporate
entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  Entrepreneurial
orientation  Family firm  Firm survival
JEL Classifications L21  L25  L26
1 Introduction
A wide stream of corporate entrepreneurship literature
proposes that entrepreneurial attitudes and behav-
ior are crucial antecedents for a company’s short- and
long-term success (e.g., Dess et al. 2003; Zahra and
Covin 1995; Zahra et al. 2000). Effective corporate
entrepreneurship allows a firm to exploit its current
competitive advantage while also exploring future
opportunities and required competencies (Covin and
Miles 1999; Kuratko et al. 2005; Schendel and Hitt
2007). In an environment of rapid change and short-
ened product and business model life cycles, future
profit streams from existing operations are uncertain,
requiring businesses to constantly seek new opportu-
nities. Therefore, firms may benefit from adopting
corporate entrepreneurship (Rauch et al. 2009).
Partly in contrast to these claims of the pivotal role
of corporate entrepreneurship for organizational suc-
cess, research on entrepreneurship in family firms
that have survived and prospered for long periods of
time is divided as to whether these organizations
represent a context where entrepreneurship flourishes
or is hampered (e.g., Naldi et al. 2007). Scholars
argue that the particular culture and power structure
found in many family firms may considerably influ-
ence the extent to which entrepreneurial activities are
encouraged or hindered (Hall et al. 2001; Salvato
2004; Schein 1983; Zahra et al. 2004). Some propose
that family firms present unique settings for entre-
preneurship to flourish, for example, stewardship
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behavior (Eddleston and Kellermanns 2006), family-
to-firm unity (Eddleston et al. 2008a), and long-term
horizons (Zellweger 2007). In contrast to this positive
perspective, Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) suggest
that reliance on long-term planning horizons runs
counter to the proactive nature of the entrepreneurial
process, and that a long-term tenure is optimal for
conservative and less entrepreneurial firms (Covin
1991; Covin and Slevin 1991). Studies suggest that
family firms are endangered by, for example, strate-
gic simplicity and inertia (Cabrera-Suarez et al. 2001;
Miller 1983; Morris 1998). Moreover, Schulze et al.
(2003) acknowledge the serious tensions that develop
within the family firm between the need for change
and stability, with entrepreneurship seen as an
antidote to stability and strategic simplicity.
The finding that many family firms have managed
to survive and flourish over long periods of time
despite low levels of corporate entrepreneurship
challenges traditional entrepreneurship wisdom. In
light of these considerations and different findings in
the literature, we see a need for further reflection on
corporate entrepreneurship in the context of long-
lived family firms. We specifically examine entre-
preneurial orientation (EO) and treat EO as a key
construct of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Miller 1983).
We analyze corporate entrepreneurship in long-
lived family firms through three in-depth case studies
of Swiss firms, between 80 and 175 years old. To
touch upon the uniqueness of entrepreneurship in
family firms originating from the systemic interac-
tions between the individual, the family, and the firm
(Habbershon et al. 2003), we interviewed 13 top-
echelon firm managers. Following precedent, we
chose a qualitative methodology to encompass the
different findings on corporate entrepreneurship in
the family firm realm (Eisenhardt 1989). Using this
methodology, we strive to overcome problems asso-
ciated with the use of single-respondent survey data
in entrepreneurship research (Zahra et al. 1999) and
to address the general lack of attention to the lagged
effect among the antecedents, performance outcomes,
and different forms of corporate entrepreneurship
(Dess et al. 2003).
By investigating EO in the context of long-lived
family firms, we make several important contribu-
tions to the entrepreneurship and family business
literatures. We not only shed additional light on the
question of whether corporate entrepreneurship is a
necessary condition for long-term success, but also
add to the entrepreneurship literature by investigating
the relationship between EO and performance (e.g.,
Rauch et al. 2009). Therefore, we build on and add to
Zahra et al.’s (1999) reflection on equifinality, which
suggests that organizations can utilize different
orientations to reach the same objective and achieve
the same outcome(s). Second, our analysis provides a
more fine-grained perspective of EO in the context of
family firms, which may help to explain the differing
views in the literature about patterns of corporate
entrepreneurship, such as about autonomy or risk
taking (e.g., Nordqvist et al. 2008; Zahra 2005).
Because we reach beyond the existing dimensions of
EO and propose additional scales that have not been
incorporated thus far, we follow the continuous calls
of researchers to apply established concepts from the
entrepreneurship field in the family business context
in order to advance both fields (e.g., Chrisman et al.
2005; Chua et al. 2003; Hoy and Verser 1994).
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we
provide theoretical foundations by giving an over-
view of corporate entrepreneurship research in the
context of family firms. Second, we illustrate our case
research methodology and describe the firms we
examined. Third, we present our case study findings
regarding the five EO dimensions and, where appro-
priate, develop propositions as analytical generaliza-
tions. Finally, we discuss our insights, examine
limitations, and provide directions for future research.
2 Theoretical foundations
Corporate entrepreneurship is seen as critical to
family firm success and survival across generations
(Kellermanns and Eddleston 2006; Rogoff and Heck
2003; Salvato 2004). It refers to entrepreneurial
activities within organizations that are designed to
revitalize the company’s business and to establish
sustainable competitive advantages (cp. Kellermanns
and Eddleston 2006; Kuratko et al. 2005; Zahra 1995,
1996). However, literature is discordant about the
firm-level entrepreneurial tendencies of family firms.
On one side, numerous researchers claim that family
firms constitute an environment that is conducive to
high levels of corporate entrepreneurship (Aldrich and
Cliff 2003; McCann et al. 2001; Rogoff and Heck
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2003; Zahra et al. 2004). On the other side, scholars
argue that family firms exhibit lower levels of
entrepreneurial activities, as they are assumed to be
risk averse (e.g., conservative and resistant to change
and adaptation over time) (Allio 2004; Poza et al.
1997; Shepherd and Zahra 2003; Whiteside and
Brown 1991). Recently, a number of articles have
examined factors in family firms that affect corporate
entrepreneurship, such as organizational culture (Hab-
bershon and Pistrui 2002; Hall et al. 2001; Zahra et al.
2004), generational involvement (Kellermanns and
Eddleston 2006), and stewardship characteristics
(Eddleston et al. 2008a; Miller et al. 2008).
Also, a steadily growing stream of literature has
investigated EO as a core concept of corporate
entrepreneurship in the context of family firms (e.g.,
Martin and Lumpkin 2003; Nordqvist et al. 2008).
EO refers to the strategy-making processes and styles
of firms that engage in entrepreneurial activities
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996, 2001). Since our research
explores EO and its dimensions of autonomy, inno-
vativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competi-
tive aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess 1996), we
deem it important to examine these dimensions and
related research in the context of family businesses.
Autonomy as captured in the EO construct refers to
the ‘‘independent action of an individual or a team in
bringing forth an idea or a vision and carrying it
through to completion’’ (Lumpkin and Dess 1996,
p. 140), that is, the ability and will to be self-directed
in the pursuit of opportunities. In an organizational
context, it refers to actions taken free of stifling
organizational constraints. Thus, even though factors
such as resource availability, actions by competitive
rivals, and internal organizational considerations may
change the course of new-venture initiatives, these are
not sufficient to extinguish the autonomous entrepre-
neurial processes that lead to new entry. Throughout
the process, the organizational player remains free to
act independently, to make key decisions, and to
implement policy (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). In the
context of family firms, Martin and Lumpkin (2003)
show that the autonomy of family members of
successive generations decreases. Family manage-
ment limits its own autonomy by involving more
people in decision-making processes and installing
strong boards of directors. In a similar way, Spinelli
and Hunt (2000) claim that a paternalistic leadership
style is replaced by a more participative style in later
generations. Nordqvist et al. (2008) view autonomy as
important regarding long-term entrepreneurial perfor-
mance and suggest considering autonomy as having
both an external (autonomy from stakeholders such as
banks, suppliers, customers, and financial markets)
and an internal (empowering individuals and teams
within an organization) dimension. Hence, literature
seems to propose that, while autonomy may be seen as
an important factor of corporate entrepreneurship,
both internal and external autonomy need to be
considered, whereas internal autonomy of family
members of succeeding generations decreases.
Innovativeness refers to ‘‘a firm’s tendency to
engage in and support new ideas, novelty, experi-
mentation, and creative processes that may result in
new products, services, or technological processes’’
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996, p. 142). There is typically a
continuum of innovativeness regarding both the scope
and pace of innovation in products, markets, and
technologies. Wealth is created when existing market
structures are disrupted by introducing new goods or
services, shifting resources away from existing firms
and causing new firms to grow (Schumpeter 1942).
The key to this cycle of activity is entrepreneurship:
the competitive entry of innovative ‘‘new combina-
tions’’ that propel the dynamic evolution of the
economy (Schumpeter 1934). In family firms, inno-
vativeness is regarded as a highly important dimen-
sion of EO for long-term performance, together with
autonomy and proactiveness (Nordqvist et al. 2008).
McCann et al. (2001) find that younger and smaller
family firms are more likely to be innovative than
older, larger family firms. Furthermore, innovative-
ness is described as having greater potential for high
performance, if it is driven by comprehensive stra-
tegic decision-making and long-term orientation
(Eddleston et al. 2008a; McCann et al. 2001).
Risk taking, in turn, refers to ‘‘the degree to which
managers are willing to make large and risky resource
commitments—i.e., those which have a reasonable
chance of costly failures’’ (Miller and Friesen 1978,
p. 932). Recent research draws a more fine-grained
picture about the risk taking propensity of family firms
(e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Morck and Yeung
2003). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) find that family
firms take decisions based on reference points. To
protect socio-emotional wealth, family firms accept
risk to their performance and, at the same time, avoid
decisions that aggravate risk. Naldi et al. (2007) report
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that risk taking in family firms is positively associated
with proactiveness and innovation and negatively with
financial performance. Zahra (2005) finds that chief
executive officer (CEO)–founder duality has no effect
on risk taking, while long CEO tenure has a negative
effect. Nordqvist et al. (2008) find that in family firms
‘‘there are less signs of risk-taking and competitive
aggressiveness in comparison to proactiveness, inno-
vativeness and autonomy’’ (p. 108). Martin and
Lumpkin (2003) find partial support for their claim
that family firms are more risk averse in later
generations. Thus, literature on risk taking in family
firms is divided on whether firms are risk-averse or
risk-inclined organizations. Moreover, the validity of
research is undermined by inconsistencies regarding
the definition and measurement of risk taking. Martin
and Lumpkin (2003) investigate risk in terms of
investing personal assets and making loans to the
business, tolerance of debt, and the importance of
increasing profitability. Other authors investigate
willingness to innovate (Benson 1991), variation of
performance outcomes (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007), or
debt levels (Mishra and McConaughy 1999). In light
of these inconsistencies in the literature, an assessment
of family firms’ risk aversion is problematic.
Proactiveness refers to a firm’s efforts to seize
new opportunities. Lumpkin and Dess (2001, p. 431)
define proactiveness as an ‘‘opportunity seeking,
forward-looking perspective involving introducing
new products or services ahead of the competition
and acting in anticipation of future demand to create
change and shape the environment.’’ It involves not
only recognizing changes, but also being willing to
act on those insights ahead of the competition (Dess
and Lumpkin 2005). Similarly, Stevenson and Jarillo
(1990) conceptualize proactiveness as the organiza-
tional pursuit of favorable business opportunities.
Proactive behavior can lead to first-mover advantages
and higher economic profits (Lieberman and Mont-
gomery 1988). According to Kreiser et al. (2002), the
dimension of proactiveness has received less atten-
tion from entrepreneurship researchers than, for
example, the dimensions of innovativeness and risk
taking. In the context of family firms, proactiveness is
regarded as more important, together with autonomy
and innovativeness (Nordqvist et al. 2008). These
authors argue that, when the historical path/new path,
independence/dependence, and informality/formality
dualities are kept taut, family firms are freer to act
independently and proactively, thereby avoiding risk
taking and competitive aggressiveness. Martin and
Lumpkin (2003) find that proactiveness does not
seem to be a consistent predictor of family firm
success, and they were not able to prove that
proactiveness decreases with later generations. In
sum, the literature presents different findings regard-
ing the relevance of this entrepreneurship dimension.
Finally, competitive aggressiveness refers to ‘‘a
firm’s propensity to directly and intensely challenge
its competitors to achieve entry or improve position,
that is, to outperform industry rivals in the market-
place’’ (Lumpkin and Dess 1996, p. 148). Compet-
itive aggressiveness can be reactive as well. For
instance, a new entry that is an imitation of an
existing product or service would be considered
entrepreneurial if the move implies an aggressive,
head-to-head confrontation in the market. According
to Lumpkin and Dess (1996), competitive aggres-
siveness also embraces nontraditional methods of
competition, such as new types of distribution or
marketing. Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that, as
later generations assume control and focus more on
value and profitability than on directly challenging
competitors to gain market share, the level of
competitive aggressiveness decreases. In a qualitative
study, Nordqvist et al. (2008) suggest that few of
their interviewees choose to take on a competitor
head-on (Lumpkin and Dess 1996), instead compet-
ing with little consideration of competitors’ actions.
This seems to suggest that an essential feature of
entrepreneurial behavior, competitive aggressiveness,
is of lower relevance in the context of family firms.
In sum, research provides ambiguous findings as to
whether the family firm context fosters or hampers
corporate entrepreneurship. Also, scholars propose
considering certain EO dimensions separately (e.g.,
internal and external autonomy; Nordqvist et al.
2008) to capture the full extent of entrepreneurial
postures, thus questioning the applicability of the
construct in the family firm context. Moreover,
literature measures certain EO scales inconsistently
(e.g., risk taking) (Zahra 2005). In light of such
concerns about levels and patterns of corporate
entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms, we see
a need to revisit the underlying assumptions of both
corporate entrepreneurship and family business
research as a first step toward a better understanding
of corporate entrepreneurship in this context.
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Therefore, we follow Low and MacMillan’s (1988)
advice that the entrepreneurship field will be better
served if the issue of theoretical perspective is
addressed directly and if assumptions are made
explicit.
Considering the implicit assumption of entrepre-
neurship research we suggest that the entrepreneur-
ship field has generally considered younger and often
fast-growing firms, stressed the dynamic context in
which firms are embedded, and often focused on
owner-managed firms in the first generation, which
have a short-term horizon (Gartner 1990; Zahra and
Sharma 2004). Success is often determined in terms
of growth or financial performance and the harvesting
of entrepreneurial opportunities. Despite the assertion
that families may assist a firm’s start-up phase by
investing personal assets (Aldrich 1999; Chrisman
et al. 2002), the family aspect has been widely
neglected in traditional entrepreneurship research.
In contrast, we see family business research
embedded mainly in the context of established,
larger, and often multigenerational firms in mature
industries, with long planning horizons and strong
emphasis on family aspects and relationships across
all types of managerial activities (Hoy 1992; Hoy and
Verser 1994). Success is often defined in broader
terms, including nonfinancial performance or the
survival of the firm. As the focus is rather on family
relationships, entrepreneurial behavior of firms is
widely neglected. For a better illustration, these
aspects of both entrepreneurship and family business
literature are summarized in Table 1, which provides
a prototypical overview of these two perspectives,
each containing specific assumptions about the type
of firm, industry, ownership, resource challenge,
planning horizon, measures of performance, and
corresponding research focus.
The inherent danger of this artificial dichotomiza-
tion is that a certain behavior (e.g., entrepreneurial) is
applied or misunderstood as the normative concept of
the ‘‘right’’ behavior in any context. Through the
theoretical lens of corporate entrepreneurship, a
family firm navigating in a stable competitive context
might be considered as nonentrepreneurial, thereby
lacking a fundamental precondition for its long-term
success. However, there are concerns in entrepre-
neurship literature about equifinality, which suggests
that organizations can utilize different orientations to
Table 1 The traditional
perspectives of
entrepreneurship and family
business literature
Based on Hoy and Verser
(1994), Hoy (1992), Gartner
(1990), Brockhaus (1994),
Sharma (2004), and Zahra
and Sharma (2004)
Entrepreneurship literature Family business literature
Type of firm
Young, newly created, often fast-growing,
small and mid-sized firms
Established, traditional, often multigenerational,
and larger firms
Type of industry
Growing and dynamic industries
and markets
Mature industries and saturated markets
Type of ownership
Owner-managed/first-generation
partnerships
(Multigenerational) family ownership
Resource challenge
Adding resources to establish an
organization in the competitive
environment
Reconfiguring and shedding resources to continue
and readjust an organization in the competitive
environment
Planning horizon
Short Long
Measures of success and performance
Financial performance
Taking advantage of opportunities in the
market
Survival and family succession
Meeting a mixed goal set of financial and
nonfinancial performance dimensions
Main focus of research
Entrepreneurial behavior (family
relationships are widely neglected)
Family relationships in a business context
(entrepreneurial behavior is widely neglected)
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reach the same objective (Zahra et al. 1999). Jen-
nings and Seaman (1994) propose that performance
differences may not exist between entrepreneurial
and conservative firms, making the implicit assump-
tion that first-mover firms that incur the highest risk
and costs for innovative activities would always be
rewarded for doing so (Zahra et al. 1999).
Considering these reflections, we now describe our
methodology through which we hope to gain addi-
tional insights into the levels and patterns of corpo-
rate entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms.
3 Research design
Our study relies on case study methodology. Eisen-
hardt (1989) advocates case study research when little
is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives
seem inadequate due to a lack of empirical substan-
tiation or conflict with each other, or ‘‘when freshness
in perspective to an already researched topic’’ is
needed (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 548). Punch (2005) states
that case study research is suitable in situations where
‘‘knowledge is shallow, fragmentary, incomplete or
non-existent’’ (p. 147). Based on the previous liter-
ature review and theoretical considerations, we
regard the current status of research as disparate
and knowledge as fragmented. Thus, we conclude
that a case study approach is legitimate for the
purpose of this study. Consequently, we investigate
the five EO dimensions exploratively and, where
appropriate, develop propositions ex post. This meth-
odology is supported by Punch (2005) and Yin
(1994), who state that one of the goals of explorative
case studies is to develop pertinent hypotheses and
propositions for further inquiry.
The present paper is based on three in-depth
qualitative case studies conducted in Switzerland in
2006 and 2007 as part of the Successful Transgen-
erational Entrepreneurship Practices (STEP) research
project.1 The companies are Health Pharma AG,
Taste SA, and Technics AG. Table 2 provides
detailed information about the three cases as well as
the selection criteria applied. Our case study
approach corresponds to the guidelines of the STEP
research project and has been applied in other studies
investigating EO in a qualitative manner (e.g.,
Nordqvist et al. 2008).
The interview guideline, which was developed by
a team of three researchers familiar with both EO and
family business research, contains questions pertain-
ing to all five EO dimensions. Additional descriptive
statements or questions helped researchers choose the
issues to be addressed (e.g., ‘‘how and why family
influence and/or involvement impacts a firm’s inno-
vativeness’’). In each company, two interviewers
conducted four or five semistructured interviews with
both family and nonfamily members in top-echelon
positions [e.g., CEO, chief financial officer (CFO),
head of marketing, etc.]. Each interview lasted
between 60 and 90 min. We asked the respondents
to touch upon both EO at the firm level and specific
family involvement. We audiotaped all interviews
and gathered secondary data from company websites,
annual reports, press releases, and company docu-
ments to map out major strategic entrepreneurial
actions, to describe important contingencies (indus-
try, tax structure, or environment), to document
relevant outcomes, and to accomplish ‘‘triangulation’’
(i.e., corroborate relevant information gathered
through the interviews).
The interviews were then transcribed and coded by
a PhD student who, although not involved in the
interviews, was familiar with both EO and family
business literature and with case writing. We chose a
third person for this part of our study to further
increase the reliability of our findings and interpre-
tations and to ensure divergent perspectives (Eisen-
hardt 1989). We did not use specific coding software
because the number of interviews was limited and
their length was not excessive. As the interviews
were conducted on a semistructured basis, we could
rapidly identify and access defined constructs under
consideration.
The coding led to three case study protocols, each
with a length of about 30 pages.2 These protocols
were enriched with several tables, highlighting the
family’s and the firm’s history and evolution, finan-
cials of the company, and an overview table of the
five EO dimensions, including related statements of
the interviewees. This helped us to become intimately
1 STEP is a worldwide research project, investigating entre-
preneurship in the context of multigeneration family firms; see
www.stepproject.org.
2 These case study protocols are available on request from the
authors.
72 T. Zellweger, P. Sieger
123
familiar with each case and enabled unique patterns
to emerge before cross-case comparison (Eisenhardt
1989). By integrating the information gained through
the interviews with information gained through
secondary materials, we measured EO using a
combination of firm behavior and managerial per-
ceptions (Lyon et al. 2000). Following Yin (1998),
the case study protocols were organized by the
sequence of topics in the interviews. The case study
protocols and the audiotapes were then sent to the
two interviewers, who independently reviewed and
adapted the protocols.
Each of the three researchers independently
assessed the levels of the five EO dimensions at the
point of investigation for every company using a
nine-point scale ranging from 1 (low) to 9 (high). To
avoid overspecification, we formed three categories:
low (rating 1–3), medium (rating 4–6), and high
(rating 7–9). This resulted in a graphical illustration
of all five EO dimensions for every company by each
researcher (nine total EO profiles). The three
researchers then met, discussed the case study
protocols, and agreed on a final version, which varied
only marginally from the original version. After
comparing identified EO patterns, we agreed upon
one profile for each firm, reflecting our shared
understanding. Of the 45 judgments of EO levels (3
researchers 9 3 cases 9 5 dimensions), we reached
initial agreement in 42 out of 45 cases ([90%); the
rare disagreements were resolved, since they referred
to adjacent classifications. Consequently, we consider
that interrater reliability was not a main concern in
our study. In addition, researchers together consid-
ered possible shortcomings and extensions of the
existing EO measures, resulting in a refined concep-
tual grid on EO in the context of long-lived family
firms (cp. Denzin and Lincoln 2000).
As a further test of the reliability of our findings,
and in line with suggestions by Denzin and Lincoln
(2000), we performed a member check by cross-
checking our work with managers’ perceptions. The
interviewees had the opportunity to read and com-
ment on the case study protocols and our assessment
of the EO patterns of their companies. This procedure
Table 2 Overview of selected cases
Company name Health Pharma AG Taste SA Technics AG
Industry Pharmaceuticals Consumer goods Printing and filtration
Employees in
2007
340 175 2,000
Company age 140 years 80 years 175 years
Annual sales
2007
60 million Euros 30 million Euros 200 million Euros
Export
orientation
5% of sales 30% of sales Subsidiaries in 21 countries,
representations in 75 countries
Ownership 100% family owned
(two branches, 51%:49%)
100% family owned by Taste
brothers (51%:49%)
Owned by 150 descendants of the nine
founding families ? a few managers
(ca. 95% family ownership)
Family
involvement
CEO and CFO, members
of the supervisory board
CEO, director of marketing CEO and members of the supervisory
board
No. of interviews 5 4 4
Position and
status of
interviewees
CEO (family), CFO (family), head
of marketing, head of production,
president supervisory board
CEO (family), head of marketing
(family), export director, chief
of production
CEO (family), CFO, president
supervisory board, member
supervisory board (family)
Family
generation
5th 3rd 7th
Selection criteria: at least second-generation family ownership; ownership group of at least two family members; one family member
in management; majority of family control in at least one of the controlled companies in the group, which has to have more than 50
employees; self-perception as a family business
Names changed for anonymity purposes
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not only is in accordance with Yin’s (1994) recom-
mendation about construct validity, but also increases
the study’s reliability. The interviewees had only
minor comments, which were incorporated into our
analysis.
4 Results
In this section, we present our case-based findings
regarding the five dimensions of EO. Figure 1
provides an overview of the levels and patterns of
EO in our family firms.
4.1 Autonomy
As outlined previously, there are arguments that in
the context of family firms the autonomy of succes-
sive generations decreases (Martin and Lumpkin
2003). Nordqvist et al. (2008) suggest considering
autonomy as having both an external and an internal
dimension. External autonomy refers to independence
from stakeholders such as banks, suppliers, custom-
ers, and financial markets. Internal autonomy is
related to empowering individuals and teams within
an organization. Nordqvist et al. (2008) suggest that,
over time, family firms may increase internal auton-
omy of their employees.
We find a clear differentiation between internal
and external autonomy. Our family and nonfamily
interviewees agree on the importance of internal
autonomy, understood as empowering individuals and
teams, as a driver of entrepreneurial activity. In-depth
interviews reveal that the third Taste generation and
the fifth Health generation successfully managed to
overcome the more patriarchal and authoritarian
leadership style of their parents (fathers). The non-
family managers of Taste SA feel that open commu-
nication in the management team and the new
management and leadership style are positive devel-
opments. Internal autonomy at the workplace is
therefore a more recent management practice, which
is adopted by later generations and is represented by
the presence of more nonfamily managers. However,
more emphasis has always been, and is still, placed
on external autonomy, meaning independence from
external stakeholders. The first and foremost goal of
all examined companies is to secure their indepen-
dence in terms of external autonomy. According to
Jean Taste, shareholder and marketing director of
Taste SA: ‘‘One of our main goals is not to endanger
the firm’s independence and family control.’’ As
Regula Blinkli, nonfamily marketing director of
Health AG, points out: ‘‘The wish for autonomy on
the company level has always been a major driving
force in the development of the company.’’ Similarly,
Karl Melber, nonfamily CFO of Technics AG,
stresses that: ‘‘Independence from external parties
has always been very important.’’
Our interviewees also suggest that external auton-
omy on the firm level may provide owners and
managers with the freedom to implement a unique
strategy that does not have to satisfy short-term-
oriented shareholder demands, hence increasing inter-
nal autonomy. A few years ago, the 150 family
shareholders of Technics AG chose not to open its
shareholder structure to the public for external and
internal autonomy reasons. Managers of Technics AG
consider external autonomy of the organization as a
means to create internal autonomy of managers, thus
generating further entrepreneurial development.
Accordingly, our scoring of EO levels shows high
levels of external and medium levels of internal
autonomy across all firms (Fig. 1). We thus support
the notion of Martin and Lumpkin (2003) and
Nordqvist et al. (2008) that internal autonomy
increases as later generations assume control of the
business and shift to a more participative leadership
style. In agreement with Nordqvist et al. (2008), we
also find a clear distinction between external and
internal autonomy, whereas external autonomy
remains highly relevant over time across all firms.
Accordingly, we propose that internal autonomy, at
least retrospectively, cannot serve as an explanation
for the continuing success of these firms. The
constant presence of external autonomy better
explains this success. In sum, we offer the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Long-lived family firms display con-
stantly high levels of external autonomy across time,
whereas internal autonomy increases as later family
generations join the firm.
4.2 Innovativeness
Innovativeness is regarded as a highly important
dimension of EO for the long-term performance of
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Taste SA Level of dimension 
Low Medium High 
EO
 d
im
en
sio
n 
External autonomy 
Internal autonomy 
External innovativeness 
Internal innovativeness 
Ownership risk 
Performance hazard risk 
Control risk 
Proactiveness 
Competitive aggressiveness 
Health AG Level of dimension 
Low Medium High 
EO
 d
im
en
sio
n 
External autonomy 
Internal autonomy 
External innovativeness 
Internal innovativeness 
Ownership risk 
Performance hazard risk 
Control risk 
Proactiveness 
Competitive aggressiveness 
Technics AG Level of dimension 
Low Medium High 
EO
 d
im
en
sio
n 
External autonomy 
Internal autonomy 
External innovativeness 
Internal innovativeness 
Ownership risk 
Performance hazard risk 
Control risk 
Proactiveness 
Competitive aggressiveness 
Fig. 1 Refined EO profiles
of the three companies
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family firms (Eddleston et al. 2008b). McCann et al.
(2001) find that younger and smaller firms are more
likely to be innovative than older and larger firms.
Furthermore, innovativeness is described as leading
to greater potential for high performance, as it is
driven by comprehensive strategic decision-making
and long-term orientation (Eddleston et al. 2008b;
McCann et al. 2001). Specific patterns of innovative-
ness seem to exist. According to Frank Taste, CEO of
Taste SA, ‘‘Innovativeness is truly important since
the introduction of our top-selling chocolate bar in
the 1940s was a true innovation. But customers are
slow in accepting new products and often show a high
preference for a product they had known for years.
Consequently, the introduction of new products and
the entrance to new markets has been rather slow.
Still, the company earns the largest part of its sales
volume with the chocolate bar.’’
Similarly, Technics AG did not constantly display
high levels of innovativeness over its nearly
180 years of existence. Revolutionary phases, some-
times with intervals of up to three decades, were
interspersed with evolutionary and incremental inno-
vation phases. As the family CEO of Technics AG, a
company that is active in an industry with proven
manufacturing standards, states: ‘‘Big innovations
come in waves and always have to be digested.’’
Health AG managed to generate sales of roughly 60
million Euros in a highly regulated niche market with
little innovation in new products or development of
new markets. According to the family CEO, Mrs.
Julia Health, the firm is ‘‘not very innovation-driven
when we look at new products, production processes,
or technology.’’ Innovativeness is restricted by family
heritage to a certain extent (e.g., products carrying the
name of the former family CEO). Change occurs
slowly and over time. When Regula Blinkli, non-
family Head of Marketing, asks ‘‘why is this so?’’, the
answer often is: ‘‘This has always been like that, it
comes from the former family CEO.’’
Beyond fluctuating levels across time, we identify a
distinct pattern of innovativeness that is not captured
by the traditional EO construct. We find high levels of
innovativeness within these firms, in forms that are less
visible from the outside and are not represented by
‘‘the new’’ in terms of products, services, or techno-
logical processes (i.e., external innovation). However,
these firms have made improvements that are innova-
tive and value-generating through renewal from within
(i.e., internal innovation). As Health AG’s CEO
mentions: ‘‘Innovation rather comes from the inside;
for example, the introduction of new management
systems and structures than from the product or
production side.’’ More specifically, in recent years
the firms under investigation have concentrated on
implementing new management techniques such as
fostering internal improvement processes or financial
management systems (Health AG), introducing a
balanced and effective governance structure that
represents the owning families with a committed
management board (Technics AG), or implementing
an umbrella brand strategy (Taste SA). This focus on
internal innovativeness could be explained by the
discretionary scope of action for the owner-managers
of these firms. Due to higher degrees of internal
freedom and lower degrees of freedom in an industrial
context dominated by large multinationals, internal
changes were more easily conceivable than changes
that immediately affect the marketplace. The research-
ers’ independent scoring of internal and external
innovativeness reveals medium to low levels of
external innovativeness (new products, markets, and
technological processes) and medium to high levels of
internal innovativeness (new managerial processes,
structures, and management systems) (Fig. 1).
By connecting the two insights on fluctuating
levels of innovativeness across time and the differen-
tiation between internal and external dimensions, we
find that the family-dominated life cycle of manage-
ment and ownership structure has an impact on the
variation of both types of innovativeness. Within
Taste SA and Health AG, we find high degrees of
internal innovativeness during the first years after the
transfer of control from one family generation to the
next. After having assumed control from their father,
the Taste brothers first built a management team and
redefined leadership structures, thereby focusing on
internal innovativeness. Once these changes were in
place, their focus shifted to external innovativeness in
terms of launching new products. Similarly, the
family managers of Health AG implemented a man-
agement information system to monitor the actual
financial performance of the firm before focusing on
external innovativeness. In both cases, the preceding
generations’ management style was highly personal-
ized. Therefore, the later generation assuming control
first had to resolve issues surrounding internal reor-
ganization and innovativeness of decision-making,
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leadership team, and style. Only after these challenges
had been met could external product and market
innovations be considered.
Thus, we add two key insights to the innovative-
ness dimension within EO in the context of long-lived
family firms. First, to capture the full extent of
entrepreneurial behavior, innovativeness should dif-
ferentiate between an external and an internal
perspective. Second, the level of both external and
internal innovativeness varies continuously over time
and is strongly affected by generational changes.
Accordingly, we develop the following propositions:
Proposition 2a The level of external innovative-
ness (new markets, products, and technological
services) and internal innovativeness (new processes,
structures, and management systems) in long-lived
family firms fluctuates across time.
Proposition 2b Generational changes positively
impact both forms of innovativeness.
4.3 Risk taking
As outlined in our theory section, ambiguous findings
about levels of risk taking in family firms may be
related to inconsistent use of definitions and measures
(for an overview refer to, e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al.
2007; Morck and Yeung 2003). Martin and Lumpkin
(2003) investigate risk in terms of investing personal
assets and making loans to the business, tolerance of
debt, and the importance of increasing profitability.
Other authors investigate willingness to innovate
(Benson 1991), variation of performance outcomes
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007), or debt levels (leverage)
as a measure of control risk (Mishra and McConau-
ghy 1999). Drawing on this confusion, Zahra (2005)
claims that a broader definition of risk taking is
needed, as it is a complex construct with presumably
multiple dimensions.
Our findings shed further light on the intriguing
issue of risk taking in family firms. Prima facie, our
family firms are risk averse when measured in terms
of leverage. The average share of equity from total
assets is 75% in our firms. Across generations, all
firms have been very ‘‘cautious with debt capital,’’
according to the family CFO of Health AG. To avoid
the risk of losing control over the company (control
risk), they financed investments with their own cash
flow (Mishra and McConaughy 1999).
Furthermore, the level of performance hazard risk,
defined as the risk of organizational failure induced
by business decisions, is low. This type of risk is
measured through the probability of organizational
failure or threats to survival (Hoskisson et al. 1991).
We find that our family firms did take what Frank
Taste labeled ‘‘calculated business risks,’’ that is,
balancing the performance hazard risks associated
with management decisions against existing solutions
so that a project’s failure would not threaten the
firm’s survival. As the president of the supervisory
board of Technics AG states: ‘‘We will only engage
in projects that do not endanger the company as a
whole.’’ In a similar way, the family CFO of
Health AG claims that making a major step forward
is difficult, ‘‘as only small risks are taken and only
low levels of debt capital accepted.’’ A member of
Heath’s supervisory board states that ‘‘it is better to
muddle through with an existing concept without
making large resource commitments. Being active in
niches with amortized machinery is typical for
companies like ours.’’
In all cases, the family’s background has a
negative impact on taking decisions that could
increase performance hazard risk. This may be
understood in light of increased ownership risk,
understood as investing most of one’s personal
wealth in only one or a few assets with no or only
limited diversification. All interviewed family owners
had assumed a high ownership stake in the family
firm. According to the CFO of Technics AG: ‘‘The
family shareholders prefer a stable dividend. We need
to assure the dividend flow at any time, since there
are family members for which the investment in our
firm represents the largest part of their wealth and
their pension fund.’’
Accordingly, our cases reveal a nuanced pattern of
risk taking once we differentiate between control risk
(measured as leverage levels), performance hazard
risk (measured as probability of organizational fail-
ure), and ownership risk (measured as owners holding
undiversified assets). The researchers’ independent
scoring reveals that all firms displayed higher levels
of ownership risk and lower levels of both perfor-
mance hazard and control risk (Fig. 1). Thus:
Proposition 3 Long-lived family firms display
higher levels of ownership risk and lower levels of
both performance hazard and control risk.
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4.4 Proactiveness
Inconsistent findings exist in the literature about the
relevance of proactiveness in the context of family
firms. Nordqvist et al. (2008) argue that, when the
historical path/new path, independence/dependence,
and informality/formality dualities are kept taut,
family firms are more inclined to be proactive. In
contrast, Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that
proactiveness does not seem to be a consistent
predictor of family firm success.
In our case studies, long-lived family firms
displayed low to moderate levels of proactiveness
(Fig. 1). Specifically, we find that, in contrast to the
central role entrepreneurship literature assigns to
proactiveness, the companies in our study follow an
evolutionary rather than a proactive path. A member
of the supervisory board of Health AG claims that:
‘‘You should rather postpone building facilities and
work with fewer people, in particular if the outlooks
are rather uncertain.’’ Frank Taste admits that his
company has lived off its two top-selling products
‘‘for a bit too long.’’ However, along with the
transition from the second to the third generation, a
new entrepreneurial spirit has developed within the
company. The two third-generation Taste brothers
and their team have successfully launched a new
product line, increased export orientation, and intro-
duced an umbrella brand strategy: the first proactive
moves after a long period of a reactive competitive
posture. The family CEO of Technics AG draws a
comparable picture about proactiveness spaced
across long intervals. ‘‘In 1910 our company was at
the forefront of a technological revolution, and in
1947 we introduced another product line, way ahead
of our competitors. Today we strive to be proactive
by reducing ecological concerns related to the use of
our products.’’
Hence, the firms we examined cannot be consid-
ered consistently strong proactive organizations.
Taste SA and Health AG, for instance, have moved
from pure trading activities to installing their own
production facilities, repeatedly increasing their
capacities across time. However, in most cases these
investments were not undertaken as first moves, but
were the result of long-term market screening and
observation of competitors’ actions. Even though the
current management teams of Taste SA, Health AG,
and Technics AG seem to display a proactive
mindset, it remains unclear to what extent nonoper-
ating family shareholders would support proactive
investments associated with large and risky resource
commitments. As the family CEO of Health AG
points out, family members not involved in firm
operations would most likely inhibit a proactive
move (e.g., opening overseas production facilities). In
a similar way, a family supervisory board member of
Technics AG states: ‘‘As you know, our non-operat-
ing shareholders are rather risk averse. They have
what I would call a ‘pension fund mentality.’ And
they have said no to a recent opportunity to acquire a
nano-technology company that would have allowed
us to enter a market that could become relevant in our
field.’’ These cases suggest that family owners not
involved in business operations hinder bold proactive
moves.
In sum, we contribute to research on proactiveness
in family firms with two insights. First, our firms
exhibit a dynamic pattern regarding the level of
proactiveness over time. They show longer periods of
rather low levels of proactiveness, interrupted by
phases of carefully selected proactive moves. Most of
these firms adopted a wait-and-see posture, waiting
for the right moment to leap ahead of the competition.
Second, given our findings on family shareholders not
involved in firm operations, we suggest that family
CEOs willing to be more proactive may be hindered
by family ownership structure. More formally stated:
Proposition 4a Proactiveness in long-lived family
firms fluctuates over time, with periods of low levels
of proactiveness interspersed with carefully selected
proactive moves.
Proposition 4b The stronger the influence of family
shareholders not involved in the firm’s operations,
the lower the level of proactiveness in long-lived
family firms.
4.5 Competitive aggressiveness
Family business research seems to indicate that
competitive aggressiveness is of significantly lower
relevance in the context of family firms (Martin and
Lumpkin 2003; Nordqvist et al. 2008). Eddleston
et al. (2008b) suggest that comprehensive strategic
decision-making and long-term orientation can be
seen as antecedents to competitive aggressiveness and
innovativeness.
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Our case analysis reveals that all three firms under
investigation display low levels of competitive
aggressiveness (Fig. 1). For example, our intervie-
wees voice a strong desire to dominate a market
niche, thereby avoiding head-to-head competition
and striving to be a ‘‘hidden champion’’ (Simon
1996); with hidden understood not in terms of
invisibility due to smaller size but as a competitive
posture that avoids direct confrontation. By following
a nonaggressive posture, our firms preferred a ‘‘live
and let live’’ and ‘‘let them do their things’’ posture.
As Norbert Health, CFO of Health AG, points out:
‘‘Being aggressive would not fit our company at all.
I prefer a differentiation of our company that is based
on our basic values and on our tradition as a Swiss
family business. We have to be cautious with our
outside appearance; we have to avoid aggressiveness
and pomposity. We prefer being small but nice—a
pearl in the market. The aim is sustainable success
and not short-term profit maximization.’’
In a similar way, the family marketing director of
Taste SA claims: ‘‘Recently, a competitor tried to
increase his market share with a radical change of the
product’s packaging. However, the customers did not
accept the fancy changes, since the product itself
remained the same. The resulting damage for the
brand and also the company is tremendous. Such
aggressive marketing campaigns would never have
happened in our company.’’
We interpret these statements on lower competitive
aggressiveness not only in light of the resource
constraints these firms face in comparison with the
industry giants with which they are competing, but
also as a concern for firm reputation. Family man-
agers might be particularly hesitant to be seen as
aggressive, since a negative corporate reputation for
aggressive firm behavior might negatively affect the
reputation of the family and the manager. This is due
to identity overlaps between the firm, family, and
individual and is reinforced by the inability to leave
the family or to easily switch management structures
(Dyer and Whetten 2006; Martin and Lumpkin 2003).
Tying back to existing research, we partly support
the findings of Martin and Lumpkin (2003) that
competitive aggressiveness might be lower for later-
generation family firms. However, we reach beyond
their assertion that decreasing competitive aggres-
siveness across generations may be induced by
increasing levels of family orientation. We propose
a reputation-based rationale for why competitive
aggressiveness should be lower in long-lived family
firms. Reputation strengthens over time and is
dependent on governance and ownership structures
(Rindova and Fombrun 1999). Our three companies
have built strong reputations over decades whereby
this reputation is supported by stable governance and
ownership and structures, and all family members are
concerned that aggressive behavior might destroy that
image, including negative effects on personal repu-
tation due to overlapping identities (Dyer and Whet-
ten 2006). More formally stated:
Proposition 5 Competitive aggressiveness of long-
lived family firms decreases over time due to
reputation concerns of the controlling family.
5 Discussion and implications
We set out to investigate the concept of firm-level
corporate entrepreneurship measured through the EO
construct in the context of long-lived family firms,
given the inconsistent results in the literature about
how entrepreneurship should be understood in this
specific context (Schulze et al. 2003; Zahra et al.
2004). Through three in-depth case studies of family
firms, each between 80 and 175 years old, in which
we interviewed 13 family and nonfamily managers,
we touch upon the uniqueness of firm-level corporate
entrepreneurship that arises from the systemic inter-
action of individual, family, and firm. With this case-
based methodology, we strive to overcome problems
associated with the use of single-respondent survey
data in entrepreneurship research (Zahra et al. 1999)
and address the general lack of attention to lagged
effects among the antecedents, performance out-
comes, and different forms of corporate entrepre-
neurship (Dess et al. 2003). We thereby gain several
theoretical insights into the manifestation of corpo-
rate entrepreneurship in this specific context.
First, and in contrast to the prevailing view in the
entrepreneurship field, interviews seem to indicate
that our firms exhibit low, or at best medium, levels
of the five salient EO dimensions. This partly
contradicts the assumption that lower levels of EO
should endanger organizational survival and prosper-
ity (e.g., Covin et al. 2006; Dess et al. 2003; Wiklund
2006; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005). Our research
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reveals that the key to generation-spanning success is
not dependent on consistently reaching the maximum
degree of all EO dimensions. ‘‘More is better’’ does
not always seem to be true. To achieve success across
generations, continuous adaptation of the company’s
EO profile seems to be necessary. Accordingly, we
claim that generational change has a strong impact on
EO, and we provide a dynamic perspective of EO in
family firms. The observed contradiction to general
EO wisdom might be related to the fact that the EO
construct is inherently static, as it is developed and
used to measure entrepreneurial behavior at a certain
point in time. As such, we add to Zahra et al.’s (1999)
reflection on equifinality, which suggests that orga-
nizations can utilize different orientations to reach the
same objective.
Second, we provide a more fine-grained and
somewhat different perspective on several dimen-
sions of EO. Regarding autonomy, we support
Nordqvist et al.’s (2008) suggestion to distinguish
between external and internal autonomy. More spe-
cifically, over time, we find increasing levels of
internal autonomy and a consistently high level of
external autonomy. Accordingly, we propose that
internal autonomy, at least retrospectively, cannot
serve as an explanation for the continuing success of
these firms and that the constant presence of external
autonomy better explains this success. As a conse-
quence, we suggest that long-lived family firms
display consistently high levels of external autonomy,
whereas internal autonomy increases when later
family generations join the firm.
Regarding innovativeness, we expand existing
knowledge by finding that the corresponding scale
of EO is not perfectly suitable to examine long-lived
family firms. While our firms score low on the
traditional innovativeness scale that measures new
products, markets, and technological processes
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996), the interviews revealed
high levels of internal and ‘‘invisible’’ innovations
such as exploiting existing solutions and the improve-
ment of management systems and governance struc-
tures (i.e., internal process redesign). Although these
internal innovations also contribute to success, they
are not captured by the traditional innovativeness
scale of EO. As our interviewees point out, innova-
tiveness fluctuates over time, since innovations must
be absorbed and may not be immediately apparent.
We add to the calls by researchers to consider the
lagged effects of corporate entrepreneurship (Dess
et al. 2003) and suggest that the family life cycle has
a strong effect on innovativeness. We propose that
generational changes can increase the level of
internal and external innovativeness in family firms,
which is in line with Hoy’s (2006) claim that the life-
cycle stage of family members is a decisive factor
regarding family firm entrepreneurial behavior, and
especially innovativeness.
As for risk taking, we propose that risk is
multidimensional and suggest extending the risk
taking dimension to overcome the fragmentary pic-
ture presented by the traditional measure (Naldi et al.
2007; Zahra 2005). Specifically, we propose three
different aspects of risk, leading to a more fine-
grained understanding of this dimension. First, we
identify high levels of ownership risk, resulting from
increased levels of undiversified wealth tied to the
family firm. Second, as a result of heightened
ownership risk, we find a lower willingness to take
risky business decisions, defined as performance
hazard risk. Third, we reveal an aversion to high
levels of control risk, measured in terms of leverage.
Also, we cannot find support for the claim by Martin
and Lumpkin (2003) that the level of risk, in
whatever form, decreases as later generations join
the firm.
We also add new insights into the proactiveness
dimension, with two major findings. First, our firms
exhibit a dynamic pattern regarding the level of
proactiveness over time, with longer periods of rather
low levels of proactiveness interspersed with phases
of carefully selected proactive moves. In most cases,
these firms adopted a wait-and-see posture, waiting
for the right moment to leap ahead of the competi-
tion. Second, given our findings on family share-
holders not involved in firm operations, we suggest
that the strong influence of nonoperating family
members can hinder the proactive moves of family
CEOs. Our findings might help to reconcile the
divergent insights in the literature on the relevance of
proactiveness (e.g., Martin and Lumpkin 2003;
Nordqvist et al. 2008).
Regarding the competitive aggressiveness dimen-
sion, a main outcome of our research is that high
levels of competitive aggressiveness do not seem to
be a necessary precondition for generation-spanning
success, despite the presumably pivotal role of
competitive aggressiveness within EO (Lumpkin
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and Dess 1996). While we partly support the
argument of Martin and Lumpkin (2003) that com-
petitive aggressiveness decreases in later generations,
we suggest that this decrease may be due not only to
increasing family orientation, as these authors state,
but also to possible negative spillover effects on
personal and family reputation.
5.1 Limitations
Our research is not without limitations. In our attempt
to investigate entrepreneurship in the context of
family firms, we follow a ‘‘common denominator’’
approach (Dyer and Handler 1994; Hoy and Verser
1994), that is, examining an element or characteristic
held in common. We are aware that this approach is
limited in terms of its explicative power. If the goal is
to study family businesses through the lens of
entrepreneurship, as in our case, then that common
denominator will define what actually can and will be
studied. However, specific family-related aspects,
such as family structures, succession plans, and
family harmony, cannot be fully understood through
the lens of corporate entrepreneurship or EO. A
second possible limitation is the generalizability of
our findings, a common criticism of case study
research (Punch 2005). However, we see our inter-
pretations and the derived propositions as analytical
rather than statistical generalizations derived through
rigorous research. Additionally, as our cases all stem
from the same cultural background (Switzerland), the
applicability of our results to long-lived family firms
from other cultures may be limited. Finally, as we
extrapolate from our findings to the population of
long-lived family firms, we need to address the issue
of heterogeneity (e.g., Hall and Nordqvist 2008;
Sharma 2003). Given the selection of cases, our
findings might be particularly suited to explain
entrepreneurial behavior in mid-sized and later-gen-
eration family firms. Our considerations might be of
less relevance in the context of small and young
family firms.
5.2 Directions for future research
We suggest several avenues for future research. One
possibility is to test both our propositions and our
challenging of the implicit assumption regarding EO
that ‘‘more is better.’’ This could be done with a
cross-sectional study, investigating the stable subdi-
mensions of EO (i.e., external autonomy, ownership
risk, and control risk) that we have identified in our
case studies. To capture the changing EO subdi-
mensions over time, this study could be conducted
at two points of time, for example, before and after
a younger generation has taken over the family
business. Furthermore, we call for additional case
study research for further substantiation of our
findings. Both the survey(s) and the case studies
could take place in different cultural and industrial
contexts to further improve the generalizability of
our results. There is an opportunity to explore what
we might label the ‘‘liability of oldness,’’ as
opposed to the ‘‘liability of newness’’ (Stinchcombe
1965). Whereas young firms may act aggressively in
general (due to newness), more established organi-
zations might challenge their competitors purely to
ensure their own market presence, established rep-
utation, and survival (due to oldness). In addition,
researchers could consider the question of how the
EO profile of long-lived family firms can be
transformed over time and which factors support
or hinder such attempts. Entrepreneurship research-
ers might follow our suggestion to rethink the
definitions of the autonomy, innovativeness, and risk
taking dimensions according to the insights gained
in the family business context, which could enrich
research in other contexts. Additionally, conducting
research in the context of long-established nonfam-
ily firms could lead to valuable insights regarding
the extent to which our findings are applicable to
nonfamily firms.
6 Conclusions
Tying back to our research question, we examined the
boundaries of the EO construct when applied in the
context of long-lived family firms. Our cases show
that these firms have been successful over time, even
with moderate or low levels of overall corporate
entrepreneurship. To fully capture the patterns of
corporate entrepreneurship in family firms and to
understand these firms’ continuing success, we pro-
pose several extensions to the existing EO dimen-
sions. In such a refined EO profile, long-lived family
firms seem to display a consistent pattern of entre-
preneurship that partly challenges accepted wisdom.
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Thus, we hope to inspire future entrepreneurship and
family business scholars with our findings and
propositions. In this way, we could fulfill our goal
of giving back to the field that has enriched our work.
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